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Faculty and Deans

BOOK REVIEW
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE NEW DEAL
THE SUPREMECOURT REBORN: The Constitutional Revolution in
the Age of Roosevelt. By William E. Leuchtenburg. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995. Pp. 350. $30.00.
Reviewedby Neal Devins*

On March 29, 1937, America's constitutional landscape changed forever. A series of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and federal
efforts to combat the Depression lowered Commerce Clause and other
barriers to centralized planning. These decisions cleared the way for
launching the administrativestate.'
On April 26, 1995, the Supreme Court called into question the wisdom and continuing vitality of that constitutional revolution, ruling for
the first time in sixty years that a federal statute exceeded the power of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.2 While it is too early to tell
whether this return to "firstprinciples"3will prove to be "epochal"4or
merely a blip that will disappear from the radar screen altogether, this
possible return of a "'Constitution-in-exile'"15may soon give New Deal
nay-sayersanother nail to hammer into the coffin of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's increasingly beleaguered legacy.6
* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William & Mary. Thanks to
Dave Douglas, Robert Glennon, Hugh Graham,Alan Meese, and Eben Moglen for reading
a preliminary draft of this Review. Thanks also to Rod Ingram and Dan Pringle for
research assistance, and to the editors and staff of the Columbia LawReviewfor their care
and persistence.
1. While commentators have both heralded this event as "another great leap along
the arc of nationalistic self-definition initiated by the American Revolution," 1 Bruce
Ackerman,We The People: Foundations 105 (1991), and vilified it as "unconstitutional,. .
. nothing less than a bloodless constitutional revolution,"GaryLawson,The Rise and Rise
of the AdministrativeState, 107 Harv.L. Rev. 1231, 1231 (1994), few would dispute that the
New Deal "altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to suggest
something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place." Cass R. Sunstein,
ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 421, 448 (1987).
2. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (invalidatingfederal law
that criminalized possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school).
3. Id.
4. Cf. id. at 1657 (Souter,J., dissenting) (describing the majority'sholding "asonly a
misstep, . . . not quite in gear with the prevailing standard, but hardly an epochal case").
5. Linda Greenhouse, Past Masters: Blowing the Dust Off the Constitution That Was,
N.Y. Times, May 28, 1995, ? 4, at 1 (quoting appeals court judge and Reagan Supreme
Court nominee Douglas H. Ginsburg).
6. The 1994 Republican takeoverof Congress directlychallenged the New Deal belief
in centralized planning, including the creation of mission agencies to address identified
social ills. In particular,the Republican ContractwithAmericacalls attention to the failings
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Despite its transformative effect, there has always been considerable
doubt about whether the New Deal reached its potential. In 1937 and
1938, for example, Congress turned down Roosevelt's efforts both to reorganize the federal government7 and to improve the lot of the poorest
third of the nation through such measures as sweeping housing reforms.8
The rejection of these and other reform proposals, writes David M.
Kennedy, "may be taken as a harbinger of the principal question that has
animated New Deal scholarship ever since: Why was there not even more
radical change precipitated out of that moment of unprecedented
trauma and apparent political opportunity in the great crisis of the
1930s?"9
At the heart of this inquiry, a vigorous debate has emerged about the
wisdom of Roosevelt's efforts to displace the Lochner-erajudiciary through
his ill-fated Courtpacking plan.10 On one side of this divide, the
Courtpacking plan has been credited with triggering Justice Owen J.
Roberts's willingness-after casting the decisive vote against several early
New Deal initiatives-to sign onto the FDR agenda, the so-called "Switch
in Time Save[d] Nine."'"I On the other side, the Courtpacking campaign
has been labelled as counterproductive and has been criticized for only
galvanizing opposition to New Deal initiatives while accomplishing little
else.'2 Having raged for more than fifty years, this debate shows no sign
of letting up.
of a too powerful central government. See Louis Fisher, The 'Contract With America':
What It Really Means, N.Y. Rev. Books, June 22, 1995, at 20 ("The Contract indicts the
national government as 'too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the public's money.'
(quoting Newt Gingrich et al., Contract with America 7 (1994)).
7. See WilliamE. Leuchtenburg,FranklinD. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940,
at 277-80 (1963).
8. See id. at 135-36.
9. David M. Kennedy, How FDR Derailed the New Deal, Atlantic Monthly,July 1995,
at 87, 92.
10. The most provocativeand illuminating treatment of this topic is BarryCushman,
Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1994). For commentaryon Cushman,
see Eben Moglen, Towarda New Deal Legal History,80 Va. L. Rev. 263 (1994); EdwardA.
Purcell,Jr., Rethinking Constitutional Change, 80 Va. L. Rev. 277 (1994).
11. Joseph Aslop & Turner Catledge, The 168 Days, at 135 (1938). New Deal
Department of Justice officials have vigorously advanced this understanding. See Robert
H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy: A Study of a Crisis in American Power
Politics 190-91 (1941); Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645, 681-82 (1946) (arguing that Supreme Court
believed that it had to switch in time to avoid public acceptance of Courtpacking plan).
For Roosevelt, "the [switch] would never have come, unless this frontal attack had been
made." Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt: The Constitution Prevails lxvi (1937 volume) (1941) [hereinafter Roosevelt
Papers].
12. For example, responding to Roosevelt's claim that although "he had lost the
[Courtpacking]battle [he had] won the war,"(p. 156) James MacGregorBurns concluded
that "in view of the breakdown of the 'Grand Coalition' in the Democratic party that the
Court-packingepisode had triggered, 'it could better be said that [Roosevelt] lost the
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William E. Leuchtenburg's The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Rooseveltprovides insights into this and other
matters. Through a gripping and lucid account of some of the cases
which inspired the Courtpacking plan and, more significantly, the politics
surrounding its introduction and eventual defeat, Leuchtenburg reveals
that "at the time [of its proposal], the plan seemed to have an inherent
logic and even inevitability" (p. 131). Leuchtenburg, however, also acknowledges that this failed strategy ultimately "helped blunt the most important drive for social reform in American history and squandered the
advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in 1936" (p. 157). While the costs of
pursuing this strategy now appear greater than the risks of not launching
a "frontal attack" against the Court,'3 Leuchtenburg makes it clear that
the Courtpacking proposal was much more than the Roosevelt Administration "acting out" against a Supreme Court which it despised (pp. 108,
213-14). Not only were New Deal social welfare programs at stake, but
FDR's pursuit of centralized authority within the executive branch also
had been called into question.'4
Leuchtenburg's uncovering of the sources of the Roosevelt Administration's dissatisfaction with the Court is masterful. By focusing on White
House reaction to "Old Court" decisionmaking, Leuchtenburg demonstrates why a politician as astute as Roosevelt would risk political disaster
through his Courtpacking plan (pp. 85-131). Leuchtenburg fails, however, to explain the significance of his historiography. Instead, he serves
up a series of integrally interconnected essays-most of which have am
peared as book chapters or journal articles-without explaining how they
speak to each other. In large measure, this is intentional. Perceiving that
some readers "may be interested only in a particular essay or essays," (p.
ix) Leuchtenburg, perhaps the preeminent New Deal historian, has opted
for a "greatest hits" anthology-style presentation. As a result, the whole of
The SupremeCourtRebornfalls short of its potential. While many of its case
studies are wonderfully crafted and insightful,' Leuchtenburg leaves the
reader alone to draw ultimate conclusions about the Roosevelt Revolution. This is unfortunate, for there are dots that can and should be connected, and there are issues worthy of mention that get none.
battle, won the campaign, but lost the war.'" James M. Bums, Roosevelt: The Lion and
the Fox 315 (1956).
13. For an opposing argument that the Courtpackingplan was, at most, an ill-advised
gambit "in view of the situation Roosevelt faced at the time," see Michael Nelson, The
President and the Court: Reinterpreting the CourtpackingEpisode of 1937, 103 Pol. Sci.
Q.267, 292 (1988) (exploring Roosevelt's proposals for governmental reorganization).
14. On Roosevelt's interest in centralizing governmental authority, see generally
Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt's Government 6-11 (1966) (providing
background on factors that influenced Roosevelt's approach to government
reorganization).

15. See, e.g., pp. 82-131 (on Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan) and 180-212 (on the
appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court).
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Over the past several years, scholars have raised important questions
about whether the New Deal's pre-1937 defeats were at least in part attributable to bad lawyering, meaning poorly crafted statutes and misguided
litigation strategies.16 Roosevelt and his advisors have been criticized for
failing to take this possibility into account when crafting their Courtpacking plan.17 While no clear consensus has emerged, this claim, that lawyering matters, is of more than academic interest. It suggests that
Roosevelt could have avoided the backlash that followed the Courtpacking debacle, and that he could have convinced Congress to approve reorganization and other post-1937 reform efforts.18 It also reveals that judicial review can be influenced both by skillful lawyering and by judicial
appointments, something which today seems obvious, but was far from
clear during the pre-1937 tumult.
Leuchtenburg does not seriously address arguments that the
Supreme Court was prepared to make its switch irrespective of
Courtpacking.19 Furthermore, although recognizing that Courtpacking
hurt Roosevelt, Leuchtenburg pays scant attention to the relationship between Courtpacking and Roosevelt's failed efforts to expand the adminisHe also does not consider how
trative presidency (pp. 157-58).
Courtpacking played into growing fears of centralized planning, which at
the time were associated with totalitarian regimes.
That the whole of The SupremeCourtRebornmay be less than the sum
of its often brilliant parts does not undermine the value of this collection.
Part I of this Book Review will highlight the ample teachings of
Leuchtenburg's work and, in so doing, will make explicit some of the
connections among the vignettes which make up The Supreme Court Re16. For arguments that such lawyering mattered, see Peter Irons, The New Deal
Lawyers4-6, 10-13 (1982) (arguing that different models of lawyeringand intra-agency
lawyeringconflicts both matter); BarryCushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The
Current of Commerce Decisions from Swif to Jones& Laughlin,61 Fordham L. Rev. 105,
146 (1992) (arguing that "craftsmanlikelabors of the NLRB lawyers"presented Supreme
Court with well-establisheddoctrinal theory to sustain the WagnerAct); Nelson, supra note
13, at 289 (arguing that even though legal craftsmanship alone would not move the
Supreme Court, it made the Court's task of reviewinglegislation easier); cf. Moglen, supra
note 10, at 269-72 (arguing against Ackerman'sthesis that fate of first New Deal differed
from second because of badly drafted and poorly defended legislation). For arguments
that lawyeringdid not matter, see Joseph L. Rauh,Jr., Lawyersand the Legislation of the
Early New Deal, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 948, 950-56 (1983) (book review) (assuming the
importance of the Courtpacking plan and claiming that "a thousand Clarence Darrows
would not likely have persuaded the [pre-1937] Court [to act] otherwise");William F.
Treanor, Book Note, 18 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 611, 612 (1983); cf.Jackson, supra note 11,
at 185-87 (suggesting that conservativejustices were entrenched and determined to thwart
the liberal administration).
17. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 249 (arguing that early New Deal statutes failed
because of poor drafting).
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra note 41 and text accompanying notes 105-106.
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born.20 In particular, Part I will reveal that the Courtpacking plan was
responsive to Supreme Court opposition to both New Deal social welfare
reforms and to centralizing governmental authority in the President. Part
II of this Book Review will challenge the Roosevelt Administration's conviction-shared
by Leuchtenberg21 -that the only way to affect Supreme
Court decisionmaking was through purely political means, by packing the
Court with pro-New Deal Justices.22 By pointing to the ways in which improved statutory drafting and brief writing and Roosevelt's landslide victory in 1936 facilitated post-1937 Supreme Court approval of New Deal
programs, Part II will uncover the plan's de minimis role in the 1937
revolution.
Part III of this Book Review will extend the analysis to a controversy
that Leuchtenburg does not address-the nexus between the Courtpacking battle and Roosevelt's efforts to centralize the government, especially
thejustice Department. Like the Courtpacking scheme, Roosevelt's 1933
reorganization of the Justice Department valued enhancing the power of
the administrative presidency over good lawyering.23 Coincidentally,
Roosevelt's decision to centralize litigation authority within the Department ofJustice paid next to no attention to the adverse consequences of
this scheme on the quality of government arguments before the Supreme
Court.24 The Justice Department reorganization therefore is an earlier
example of the failure, inherent in the Courtpacking scheme, to consider
the possible link between good lawyering and victories in court. Furthermore, the fact that the 1933 Department of Justice reorganization succeeded,25 whereas subsequent efforts at centralization failed, suggests
that, absent the backlash from the Courtpacking plan, more far-reaching
centralization could have been achieved.
My argument is that Roosevelt's adherence to the idea of a powerful
administrative presidency blinded him to the value of good lawyering.
Ironically, the fallout from the Courtpacking scheme-a
prime example
of valuing the ideal of a strong president over good lawyering-undermined future efforts to enhance the administrative presidency. Consequently, although Leuchtenburg quite rightly suggests that enhancing
20. I will not refer to either Leuchtenburg's chapter on the Supreme Court's
application, from 1925 to 1969, of select Bill of Rights amendments to state and local
government action (pp. 237-58) or his chapter on Justice Holmes's 1927 Buck v. Bell
decision, upholding mandatory sterilization of the mentally retarded (pp. 3-25). These
two chapters, although valuable for other reasons, have very little to do with the events
leading up to, or the immediate aftermath of, the constitutional revolution of 1937.
21. Leuchtenburg summarily dismisses claims that Roosevelt's Courtpacking
campaign played, at best, a small part in triggering the 1937 constitutional revolution. See
infra text accompanying notes 105-106.
22. In fact, Roberts's so-called "switch"occurred before the Courtpacking plan's
introduction, suggesting that perhaps the combination of better lawyeringand the 1936
elections, not Courtpacking, triggered the 1937 revolution. See infra note 72.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 45-48, 132-140.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 110, 127-129.
25. See infra text accompanying note 150.
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the administrative presidency mattered as much to Roosevelt and his
close aides as did getting the New Deal social welfare agenda through
Congress and the Court, The Supreme Court Reborn falls short because it
does not consider the worth of scholars, who have pointed out that a little
lawyering would have gone a long way toward getting the Court to approve many of the New Deal reforms. Like Roosevelt, Leuchtenburg assumes that the only way to change the Court was through political means.
I.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTIONIN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT

From 1933 to 1937, Franklin Delano Roosevelt fought a bitter battle
with the Supreme Court over the structure and mission of the federal
government. This Part will examine that struggle. In particular, the
revealed by The
sources of FDR's Courtpacking proposal-perceptively
Supreme Court Reborn-will be uncovered. What is uncovered is that as
much as there was a desire to expand social welfare programs, Roosevelt
and his allies were also driven by their belief in the power of the administrative presidency.
A.

The New Deal Meets the Four Horsemen

FDR's New Deal promised nothing less than a social revolution.
"The word 'Deal,' " proclaimed Roosevelt, "implied that the Government
itself was going to use affirmative action to bring about its avowed objectives .... The word 'New' implied that a new order of things designed to
benefit the great mass . .. would replace the old order of social privilege
The 1932 election heralded this New Deal. Not only did
. . . .26
Roosevelt win the presidency, but the Democrats also swept Capitol Hill
with a three-to-one majority in the House of Representatives and a two-toone majority in the Senate.27 "Swept into office with a mandate to repair
the ravages of the Depression,"28 Congress and the White House
launched their "Hundred Days War," with Congress enacting into lawsometimes "sight unseen," with less than an hour of debate, and "[w] ith a
26. Franklin D. Roosevelt, 2 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 5 (1938). For FDR,
the "Old Order," by embracing laissez-faire economics, was insensitive to the "radical
transformation"of the nation's economic substructure brought about by the Industrial
Revolution. See LawrenceLessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelityand Theory,
47 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 454 (1995) (noting that from the end of the CivilWaruntil 1929, "the
total value of manufacturedproducts increased nearly twentytimes; railroad track mileage
went from under 40,000 miles nationwide to over 260,000; [and] the urban population
increased from 16.1 percent to 49.1 percent"). As such, Roosevelt maintained, the Old
Order was responsible for the Great Depression. The "New Deal," in contrast, would
reinvigorate government, lifting the "barriersto the reasonable exercise of legislative
powers, both state and national, to meet the urgent needs of the twentieth-century
community."Jackson, supra note 11, at 175.
27. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3.
28. Id.
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unanimous shout" rather than a roll call vote-"the most extraordinary
series of reforms in the nation's history."29
The last word on the one hundred day session of the first New Deal,
however, was spoken by the Supreme Court, where many reform measures ran into a judicially constructed brick wall.30 Unlike the Congress
and White House, the federal courts were decidedly a part of the Old
Order.31 From 1920 to 1932, Roosevelt's three Republican predecessors
appointed six Supreme CourtJustices as well as two-thirds of the courts of
appeals judges and three-fourths of the district court bench.32 Making
matters worse, the three remaining Supreme Court Justices-James
McReynolds, George Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter-were part of the
"Four Horsemen of Reaction" that opposed the New Deal (p. 174). Without question, as Leuchtenburg's history makes clear, these jurists were
the immovable obstacles to New Deal reforms.
To dramatize the stakes and intensity of the FDR-Court battles,
Leuchtenburg serves up two delectable case studies, each of which illustrates a different feature of the tension between the Administration and
the "Old Court." Leuchtenburg's tale of the Rail Pension decision,33 invalidating Congressional efforts to require railroad owners and railworkers
to contribute to a common pension pool, highlights the Court's opposition to social reform programs (pp. 26-52). His account of Humphrey's
Executor v. United States,34 prohibiting the President from firing an FTC
Commissioner without cause, suggests the existence of judicial animosity
towards Roosevelt's efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency
(pp. 52-82).
Leuchtenburg treats the five-to-four Rail Pension decision as monumental, signalling the Old Court's disapproval of the New Deal. When
the decision was issued on May 6, 1935, there was great uncertainty about
the Court's attitude towards the New Deal, as well as corresponding state
reform efforts (p. 26). In 1934 and again in the first months of 1935, the
Supreme Court had issued a series of mixed decisions, some invalidating,
and others approving, state and federal reform efforts.35 In Rail Pension,
by admonishing Congress for "fail[ing] to distinguish constitutional
29. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 43, 61. During its historic 100-day session,
Congress, among other things, "committed the country to an unprecedented program of
government-industrycooperation; . . . accepted responsibilityfor the welfare of millions of
unemployed; . . . undert[ook] huge public works spending; guaranteed the small bank
deposits of the country; and ... established federal regulation of Wall Street." Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 143-45.
31. For a discussion of the "Old Order,"see Jackson, supra note 11, at 70-74. For an
insightful treatment of the role of "criticalelections" on relations between the Court and
elected government, see Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 795 (1975).
32. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3.
33. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
34. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
35. For an inventoryof 1933-1936 Court decisions, seeJackson, supra note 11, at 181.
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power from social desirability,"36 the Court appeared poised to strike
down Social Security and other New Deal reforms. According to
since it was writLeuchtenburg, the decision's strident tone-especially
ten by the previously moderateJustice Owen Roberts-"sent shock waves
through the White House and the New Deal agencies [and] . . . created
deep fissures between the executive branch and the Supreme Court" (p.
27). Indeed, within one week of the decision, Attorney General Homer
Cummings signalled the Administration's interest in striking back at the
Court,37 writing Assistant Attorney General Angus MacLean to learn
whether" 'any study has been made in this office of the right of the Congress, by legislation, to limit the terms and conditions upon which the
Supreme Court can pass on constitutional questions'" (p. 51).38
Cummings, however, might have been better served by turning his
attention internally to the manner in which Congress enacted, and the
Justice Department defended, the pension program.39 Rather than build
a record to support the measure's impact on the flow of interstate commerce, "Congress whipped the legislation through," with the House "consider[ing] it for only forty minutes before registering its approval" (p.
32). Leuchtenburg's history also casts doubt on the Justice Department's
handling of the case. While the Department focused its "efforts on demonstrating that the law stay within the commerce power," steering clear
from the measure's "social desirability" (p. 34), a memorandum drafted
by Rail Pension dissenter Benjamin Cardozo suggests that the Justice Department " 'laid undue stress ... upon the danger of keeping superannuated men in the [workforce]'" (p. 41). For Cardozo, this emphasis" 'has
given color to the [claim] . .. that the professed motive of the statute is

36. RailroadRetirement
Bd., 295 U.S. at 367. The Court therefore found the statute to
be little more than "anaked appropriationof privateproperty"in violation of due process.
Id. at 350. Of equal significance, the Court also concluded that the pension did not
protect interstate commerce and therefore found the statute outside of Congress's
commerce power. See id. at 362. The Court reasoned that to the extent that efficiency,
economy or safety "demand[s] the elimination of aged employees, their retirement from
the service [without a pension] would suffice to accomplish the object." Id. at 367. As
such, the pension was unnecessary to protect interstate commerce. See id. at 374.
37. Cummings, in a letter to Roosevelt, described the case as a "forecastof what we
may expect with reference to almost any form of social legislation." Letter from Homer
Cummings, Attorney General, to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President (May 7, 1935),
reprinted in Selected Papers of Homer Cummings: Attorney General of the United States
1933-1939, at 130 (Carl B. Swisher ed., 1939).
38. Four months earlier, at a January 11, 1935 Cabinet meeting, Cummings reported
that Roosevelt had suggested that "if the Court went against the Government" in a case
involving Congress's authority to regulate the currency through gold legislation, "the
number of justices should be increased at once so as to give a favorable majority"(p. 86)
(quoting Jan. 11, 1935 entry in Harold L. Ickes diary).
39. Leuchtenburg never criticizes the Justice Department's handling of Rail Pension,
although his history casts doubt on the Department's litigation strategy.
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not the true one' " (p. 41).40 The possibility that the Congress and the
Justice Department were partially responsible for the Rail Pension decision is not one that Leuchtenburg takes seriously. In a footnote, he dismisses claims that better lawyering and better legislative drafting might
have enabled the Old Court, without repudiating pre-New Deal precedents, to find ways to uphold much of the New Deal (pp. 317 n.95).4'
Beyond the stridency of the Rail Pension decision, Leuchtenburg also
points to "Black Monday," May 27, 1935, when the Court handed down a
trilogy of unanimous decisions invalidating key New Deal initiatives.42
The most famous of Black Monday's program victims was the National Industrial Recovery Act, "an instrument forged in the heat of the
famed '100 Days' of 1933 and wielded as the Roosevelt Administration's
chief weapon in the war against the Depression."43 The SupremeCourtReborn, however, sets its sights on a less controversial, but equally important,
Black Monday decision, Humphrey'sExecutorv. United States. At one level,
Humphrey's Executor seems anything but monumental: approving a
backpay award to the estate of an FTC Commissioner. Within the White
House, however, Humphrey'sExecutorwas considered a major blow to the
President and his reform agenda, which emphasized the rise of the administrative state and, with it, a significant expansion of presidential authority (pp. 78-80).
Perceiving that government must be able to react "flexibly and rapto
idly
stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from fluctuations in the unmanaged market,"44 the Roosevelt Administration considered a presidentially managed "system of more unified powers"45 to be
an essential part of its social reform agenda. For this system to work, the
President must be in charge of the instruments of administration, including, of course, the power to hire and fire agency heads. The Humphrey's
Executor case squarely raised this issue. William Humphrey, a Coolidge
FTC appointee who supported big business and opposed the New Deal,
was dismissed because, as Roosevelt explained to Humphrey, "'I do not
40. Moreover, according to Leuchtenburg, Cardozo perceived that "there was a better
way to defend the law-by analogizing it to a workmen's compensation act" (p. 41)
(summarizing Cardozo's memorandum).
41. Leuchtenburg concludes that Barry Cushman's work, supra note 10, is not
credible. Noting (in a footnote) that Cushman did not conduct "original research in the
papers of the Justices" and did not scrutinize "most of the cases of the era," Leuchtenburg
discounts Cushman's history as being, at best, conclusory (p. 318 n.95). Leuchtenburg,
however, never considers Peter Irons's related work on New Deal lawyering. See Irons,
supra note 16. For further discussion, see infra note 121.
42. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (rejecting
presidential dismissal of Federal Trade Commissioner); LouisvilleJoint Stock Land Bank v.
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating Frazier-Lemke Act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating National Industrial Recovery Act).
43. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 87.
44. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 424.
45. Id. at 440. For further discussion of the administrative presidency, see infra Part
III.
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feel that your mind and my mind go along together on either the policies
or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission, and frankly, I
think it is best for the people of this country that I should have full confidence'" (p. 60).
Leuchtenburg's account of the ensuing dispute is truly marvelous
and brings out the extent to which the FDR-Court battle line was really
drawn over the power of the American President. In particular, this
chronicle reveals the White House's belief that Humphrey'sExecutor was
animated by Court hostility towards Roosevelt and his administrative presidency. When argued, Solicitor General Stanley Reed thought the case
"couldn't be lost" (p. 64).46 Reed's confidence stemmed from the
Court's sweeping approval of presidential removal authority in the 1926
Myers v. United States47 decision.48 Humphrey'sExecutor, by unanimously
ruling against the President without even hinting that the Court had
changed its mind,49 shocked and outraged the Administration (pp.
78-80). Attorney General Cummings and presidential advisor Felix
Frankfurter concluded that the Court was animated by a " 'touch of malice'" (p. 79) and a "'disposition . . . to curb the executive powers'" (p.
78). As a result, "[t]he Humphrey ruling went far to persuade the President that, sooner or later, he would have to take bold action against a
Court that, from personal animus, was determined to embarrass him and
to destroy his program" (p. 79).
B.

From Courtpackingto Constitutional Revolution

Roosevelt's "bold action" was the Courtpacking plan of 1937. Claiming that the Supreme Court was unable to function effectively, Roosevelt
proposed legislation that would empower the President, for every Justice
over seventy years of age, to appoint an additional Justice until the
number of Supreme CourtJustices reached fifteen.50 Lacking, as Robert
Jackson put it, "the simplicity and clarity which was the President's ge46. After being instructed by Attorney General Cummings to "'pick out [a case] that
Executor(p. 64). Congress, too, thought the issue
you can win,' " Reed selected Humphrey's
was well settled. Humphreywas advised by Senator C.C. Dill that " 'after all the President is
boss and I can't control his appointments'" (p. 59). More striking, Roosevelt's
appointment of George Mathews to succeed Humphrey was approved unanimously by
Congress (p. 63).
47. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
48. In fact, before Roosevelt fired Humphrey, the Administration was advised, by a
former Supreme Court clerk who worked on the case (JamesLandis), that the MyersCourt
" 'deliberately put' " into its decision " 'statements to the effect that the President's power
of removal extended to members of various independent commissions'" (p. 69). The
Administration'sdefeat in Humphrey's
Executorthen cannot be blamed on poor lawyering
and strategizing.
49. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725-26 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing Humphrey'sExecutoras "gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or
historical precedent" the Court's "carefullyresearched and reasoned" opinion in Myers.)
50. When his Courtpackingplan was introduced, sixJustices were over 70 (including
all of the Four Horsemen). Under his plan, Roosevelt intended to transformthe Court by
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nius,"'5' the plan's announcement prompted an immediate and intense
firestorm of criticism from Congress, the press, and the Court itself. Why
then did the President choose this "technical and confusing"52 approach?
Leuchtenburg is at his best in answering this and several other questions
about the Courtpacking imbroglio, including why Roosevelt did not act
sooner; why he felt compelled to launch a "frontal attack"53on the Court;
why, despite his landslide 1936 victory and an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress, the plan failed; and what the political consequences of
this failure were.
Leuchtenburg uncovers that Roosevelt's plan "was not a capricious
act but the result of a long period of gestation in which it seemed sensible
to conclude that the problem lay not in the Constitution but in the composition of the Supreme Court" (p. 131). At the same time, fearful that
an overly aggressive attack against the Court might cost him at the polls,54
"Roosevelt maintained a studied silence on the question" throughout the
1936 campaign (p. 107). By February 1937, with the Court set to rule on
the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, state minimum
wage laws, and several other matters (p. 108), the President felt he could
wait no longer. Rejecting a constitutional amendment as too time consuming (p. 110) and perceiving the public to be fed up with the Court
and quite enthralled with him,55 Roosevelt settled on a plan that would
allow him to transform the Court at once by appointing Justices sympathetic to the New Deal and its vision of an administrative presidency (pp.
108-27).
Unanticipated, yet easily discoverable, social and political forces imperiled this gambit, however. Gallup polls, for example, revealed that
most voters opposed restrictions on the Court, supported Court decisions
striking down the National Recovery Act and the Agriculture Adjustment
Act, and hoped that Roosevelt's second term would be more conservative
than his first.56 Fearing the central planning and executive supremacy
associated with the totalitarian governments of Hitler and Mussolini, voters strongly opposed a radical transformation of either the American economic system or the balance of power among the three branches of goveither replacing these Justices (if they retired) or appointing additional Justices (if they
remained on the Court).
51. Jackson, supra note 11, at 189.
52. Id.
53. Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at lxvi.
54. These fears were well-founded. Following his "BlackMonday"defeats, Roosevelt
chastised the Court for relegating the nation "to [its] horse-and-buggy definition of
interstate commerce." Franklin D. Roosevelt, Press Conference (May 31, 1935), in 4
Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 220-21. This comment "createda furor" (p. 90) and
convinced the President of the need to move slowly on this issue.
55. Roosevelt, undoubtedly, was also buoyed by likely congressional support for the
measure. Congressional disapprovalof the Court was apparent; for example, "[t] he years
1935-1937 saw more 'Court-curbing'bills introduced in Congress than in any other threeyear (or thirty-fiveyear) period in history." Nelson, supra note 13, at 273.
56. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 212, 241-43; Nelson, supra note 13, at 277-78.
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ernment.57 The Courtpacking proposal, moreover, divided Democrats in
Congress, with "a number of Democratic Senators search[ing] desperately for some device that would free them from the need to commit
themselves" (p. 139).58 Nevertheless, one month after its introduction,
the proposal seemed likely to prevail. Democrats in Congress, as
Leuchtenburg rightly observes, "might not [have] like[d] the scheme,
but they could not justify frustrating the President while the Court persisted in mowing down legislation" (p. 142).
On "White Monday," March 29, 1937, the Court gave these Democrats a way out. Reversing its ten-month-old decision that New York's
minimum wage law was unconstitutional, the Court performed the
"Greatest Constitutional Somersault in History" (p. 176), upholding a
nearly identical Washington statute.59 Over the next several weeks, by
upholding the Social Security Act60 and the National Labor Relations
Act,6' the Court made it clear that it was willing to sign off onto the New
Deal and related state reform efforts. "Thus the Court, with no change of
its Justices, . . . convinced the court of Public Opinion that the sentence
of reorganization posed by the court bill might safely be suspended
"62 With the demise of his Courtpacking plan,63 Roosevelt's efforts to
....
transform the Court continued along more traditional lines. The May 18,
57. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 275-98 (discussing America's fear of the
"fascistchallenge"); Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New
Deal Revisited, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 195 (describing conservativeopposition to the New
Deal's central planning elements).
58. Roosevelt's political mishandling of the proposal exacerbated these problems.
When the proposal was introduced, Roosevelt stressed the difficulty of "aged or infirm"
Justices trying to manage the Court's crowded docket (pp. 133-34). That strategy
backfired,especiallyafter ChiefJustice Hughes wrote to Congress to report that the "Court
is fully abreast of its work"and that an increase in the number ofJustices would make the
Court less efficient. See S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 40 (1937) (Letter from
Charles E. Hughes to Burton K Wheeler (Mar. 21, 1937) (Appendix C)). In response,
Roosevelt conceded that the real purpose of his plan was to strike back at a Court that was
"actingnot as a judicial body, but as a policy-makingbody." Fireside Chat (Mar. 9, 1937),
in 6 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 122, 125.
59. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). On "WhiteMonday,"the
Court also upheld the National FirearmsAct, the amended RailwayLabor Act, and the
revised Frazier-LemkeAct. For a description of these decisions and the Roosevelt
Administration reaction to them, seeJackson, supra note 11, at 207-13.
60. See StewardMachine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
61. See NLRB v.Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
62. Jackson, supra note 11, at 235.
63. In June 1937, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a negative report on the
Courtpackingmeasure (p. 146). On July 22, 1937, the Senate-without having voted on
the measure-returned Roosevelt's Courtpacking proposal to the Judiciary Committee
"from which it never emerged" (p. 153). Leuchtenburg suggests that neither the White
Monday decisions nor Roosevelt's ability to replace retiringJustice Van Devanter doomed
the Courtpackingplan. Rather, Leuchtenburg ties the plan's defeat with Senate majority
leaderJoe Robinson's death on July 14, 1937, the eve of the Court-planvote (pp. 148-54).
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1937 retirement of "Four Horseman" Willis Van Devanter64 led to the
nomination of Senator Hugo Black, a supporter of the Courtpacking plan
and "a true believer in expanding governmental power" (p. 210).65 Over
the next two years, through a combination of deaths and retirements,
Roosevelt appointed four more New Deal allies to the Court, thereby securing the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 (p. 220).
"The Constitutional Revolution of 1937," writes Leuchtenburg, "altered fundamentally the character of the Court's business, the nature of
its decisions, and the alignment of its friends and foes ....
[It] ended,
apparently forever, the reign of laissez-faire and legitimated the arrival of
the Leviathan State" (pp. 235-36). For Leuchtenburg, these changes
were more than a doctrinal evolution; instead, "the reversals and distinctions ... [were] so numerous and so sweeping that ... [by 1942] much of
the constitutional law of 1936 appear[ed] to belong to a different constitution" (p. 233).66 Most strikingly, from 1937 to 1947, the New Deal
Court overturned thirty pre-1937 decisions.67
These changes, however, came at a great price, for the Court struggle "helped blunt the most important drive for social reform in American
history and squandered the advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in 1936" (p.
157). The controversy "deeply divided the Democratic party" (p. 158)
and "helped weld together a bipartisan coalition of anti-New Deal Sena64. Van Devanter's retirement may well have been prompted by Congress's
enactment of legislation which protected the retirement income of Supreme Court
Justices. See Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 88
(1992). It is also possible that Van Devanter-knowing that Roberts's switch secured the
1937 constitutional revolution-sought to strengthen opposition to Roosevelt and his
Courtpacking plan (pp. 143-44).
65. The Black nomination, as Leuchtenburg ably revealsin a detailed and well-crafted
case study, was extraordinarilycontroversial (pp. 180-212). For example, when Black was
nominated, the Washington Post and other newspapers spoke of finding "'it difficult to
refer to any Supreme Court nomination which combined lack of training ... and extreme
partisanship'" (p. 186) (quoting The Black Nomination, Wash.Post,Aug. 13, 1937, at 8).
Eclipsing concerns over Black's competence, an imbroglio over Black's one-time
membership in the Ku Klux Klan consumed the nomination (pp. 188-99). Yet, as
Leuchtenburg puts it, "[t]here is no evidence, however, that awarenessof this past caused
Roosevelt to think twice about appointing Black" (p. 208). Roosevelt's only concern was
the fate of New Deal economic legislation and, "given the temper of the times, [it is
improbable] that civil liberties considerations loomed large in his mind" (p. 208).
66. BarryCushman, in contrast, argues that much of the decisionmaking of the New
Deal Court had its roots in the constitutional law of 1936. See Cushman, supra note 10, at
203-08; Cushman, supra note 16, at 156; see also Moglen, supra note 10, at 269-72
(applauding Cushman's discussion of the evolution of New Deal lawyersand the impact of
this change on the success of New Deal legislation); Purcell, supra note 10, at 280-82
(agreeing with Cushman's depiction of the 1937 decisions as the result of an intertwining
of existingjurisprudence).

67. See C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and
Values, 1937-1947, at 300-01 (1963). Leuchtenburg's tally of 32 overturned decisions
includes the reversalof post-1937 decisions (p. 233).
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tors" (p. 157).68 Furthermore, the middle class's backing of Roosevelt
"ebbed away" as a result of this dispute (p. 159).69 All of this led
Roosevelt's Vice President, Henry Wallace, to remark that "[t]he whole
New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight"
(p. 158); although "[t]he new Court might be willing to uphold new laws,
... an angry and divided Congress would pass few of them for the justices
to consider."70
II.

REEXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not know the value of a good lawyer.
By refusing to place any faith in the power of improved statute drafting as
well as governmental advocacy before the Court, Roosevelt attempted to
use brute political force to take over the Supreme Court. The folly of this
campaign, as this Part will demonstrate, is that Courtpacking played no
meaningful role in triggering the 1937 Constitutional Revolution.
At the outset, it is noteworthy that the Courtpacking plan, despite its
astronomical costs, is sometimes justified as the price that needed to be
to accomplish
Roosevelt's
constitutional
paid
revolution.71
Leuchtenburg hints that this is true, rejecting the argument that New
Deal judicial defeats can be blamed on "[p] oorly drafted laws, weak
briefs, and careless arguments" (p. 232). Furthermore, he accepts the
proposition that the Court plan "may well have affected" Owen Roberts,
whose defection from the Old Court-the so-called "switch in time" signalled the 1937 Constitutional Revolution (p. 143).72 The Supreme
Court Reborn, however, does not address this topic directly. In fact,
Leuchtenburg barely considers claims that improved drafting of legislation and legal advocacy played a critical role in Roberts's switch.73 This
omission is unfortunate because strong evidence indicates that the
Courtpacking plan had, at best, limited bearing on the 1937 Revolution.
68. Absent the conflagrationover the Court plan, it is certainlypossible-but far from
certain-that another controversywould have galvanizedopposition to the New Deal. For
example, the 1937-1938 recession "helpedproduce a national mood hostile to [New Deal]
experimentation." Polenberg, supra note 14, at 151.
69. Roosevelt'sstanding with the middle classwasalso hampered by a severe recession
which called into doubt the New Deal's abilityto restore economic prosperityand stability.
See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 243-44; see also Alan Brinkley,The New Deal and the
Idea of the State, in The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980, at 85, 87 (Steve
Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (stating that the 1937 recession damaged Roosevelt's
goals even more than the general dissatisfactionwith his Courtpackingplan).
70. Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 239.
71. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
72. Roberts's"WhiteMonday"approvalof state minimum wage laws,as Leuchtenburg
recognizes, had nothing to do with Roosevelt's Courtpackingplan. Roberts "casthis vote
[in that case] before the plan was announced" (p. 177). Leuchtenburg's claim is that
Roberts's subsequent votes "maywell" have been influenced by the plan (p. 143).
73. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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There are several strands to this argument, not all of which are essential to accepting it. First, poor statutory drafting during the "One Hundred Days War" may have exacerbated Old Court hostility towards the
First New Deal. "The legislation of the [F] irst New Deal," as Michael Nelson writes "was not well drawn; it too often tied sweeping assertions of
federal power to slap-dash justifications."74 Indeed, Justice Harlan Fiske
Stone spoke of "'[t]he general sloppiness of everything that has been
done in connection with this effort' " and his " 'hope that Congress will
now undertake to do its job.' "75 By 1934, a group of highly skilled lawyers, attentive to the needs of "writing legislation to skirt the legal
landmines that were sprinkled through the Court's decisions," joined the
administration.76 Unlike the "loose draftsmanship and emotional advocacy" of the First New Deal, observed Arthur Schlesinger, the laws of this
"Second New Deal were masterpieces of the lawyer's art."77 When
Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan was proposed, the handiwork of these Second New Deal lawyers was before the Court.78
Second, poor lawyering may have contributed to some Supreme
Court defeats. With limited litigation authority until a 1933 FDR reorganization79 and without a building until 1935, the pre-Roosevelt Justice De74. Nelson, supra note 13, at 289. Senate Judiciary Chairman Henry Ashurst put it
this way: "[Because] [w]e ground out laws so fast . . . [we] reasoned from non-existent
premises and, at times, we seemed to accept chimeras, phantasies and exploded social and
economic theories as our authentic guides." Cushman, supra note 10, at 250 (quoting
Henry F. Ashurst, A Many Colored Toga: The Diary of Henry Fountain Ashurst 333
(George F. Sparksed., 1962)).
75. Alpheus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law 395 (1956) (quoting
Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to John Basset Moore, Jan. 20, 1935). Along the same
lines, after the Court struck down the Administration's 1933 "hot oil" program, Owen
Roberts informed Interior SecretaryHarold Ickes that he was "entirelysympathetic with
what [the administration was] . . . trying to do in the oil matter and that he hoped we
would pass a statute that would enable [the Administration to constitutionally] carry out
[its] policy." Harold L. Ickes, 1 The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand
Days, 1933-1936, at 269, 273 (1953) (diary entry ofJan. 11, 1935).
76. Nelson, supra note 13, at 289; see also Paul L. Murphy,The Constitution in Crisis
Times, 1918-1969, at 143-45 (1972) (discussing the "[a]ssiduously careful legal
draftsmen"of the New Deal); Cushman, supra note 10, at 255 (distinguishing the "social
evangelists"of the First New Deal, who disdained technical precision, from the "precise
and trenchant"lawyersof the Second New Deal, who "embracedlegal exactitude"); Stern,
supra note 11, at 667 (suggesting that one reason the Court, in the CarterCoalcase, struck
down the 1935 Bituminous Coal Act was Congress'sfailure to heed Department of Justice
efforts to improve the measure).
77. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Politics of Upheaval 395
(1960).
78. Witness, for example, the National Labor RelationsAct, approved by the Court as
part of its 1937 "switch."Each of the draftersof this measure was a lawyerand "the legal
training of the Act's framerswas reflected by the central role that constitutional concerns
played in their shaping of the Act's provisions." Cushman, supra note 16, at 139. For a
more detailed treatment of this episode, see Irons, supra note 16, at 226-34.
79. Through a 1933 executive order, Roosevelt transferred litigation authority from
executive agencies and departments to the Department ofJustice. See infra part III.A.
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partment had great difficulty attracting high-quality lawyers.80 Matters
did not improve much under Roosevelt, at least not at first.8' For example, Attorney General Homer Cummings, by staffing the Department
with "deserving Democrats,"82prompted Supreme Court Justices Louis
Brandeis and Harlan Fiske Stone to express their concerns over the Department's competence to Roosevelt.83While Old Court hostility towards
the New Deal may have made it impossible for any litigation strategy to
succeed,84 thejustice Department could have done a better job in several
cases,85 including the Rail Pension86 and National Industrial Recovery
Act litigation.87
Third, Old Court resistance to the New Deal programs may have
been less intense than Leuchtenburg and others suppose.88 The dreaded
80. On the Department ofJustice's difficultyin recruiting good lawyers,see Jerold S.
Auerbach & Eugene Bardach, "Born to an Era of Insecurity": Career Patterns of Law
Review Editors, 1918-1941, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist. 3, 5 (1973). On the historicallyshabby
facilities of the Department of Justice, see William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in
America: The Evolution of the Sherman AntitrustAct 103 (1965); Henry F. Pringle, The
Life and Times of William Howard Taft: A Biography 110 (1939).
81. For a detailed discussion of how expanded Department of Justice litigation
authority affected governmental advocacybefore the Supreme Court, see infra Part III.A.
82. Irons, supra note 16, at 11. Cummings, a "Democratic party wheelhorse who
helped swing the 1932 convention to Roosevelt,"was much more a politician than a lawyer.
Id.
83. See id.; see also Bruce A. Murphy, The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection 130
(1982) (suggesting that Brandeis had questions about Cummings's skills as a lawyer).
ChiefJustice Charles EvansHughes put it this way: "[T]he laws have been poorly drafted,
the briefs have been badly drawn and the arguments have been poorly presented. We've
had to be not only the Court but we've had to do the work that should have been done by
the Attorney General." Burton K. Wheeler & Paul F. Healy, Yankee from the West 329
(1962). While Hughes's comment was somewhat self-serving,seeking to place blame for
the Courtpackingcrisis on the Roosevelt Administration,it contains at least a few kernels
of truth, for disapproval of New Deal objectives cannot alone explain pre-1937
decisionmaking. See infra text accompanying notes 88-93.
84. For example, the Roosevelt Justice Department's defeat in Humphrey'sExecutor
cannot be blamed on poor lawyering. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49. On Old
Court hostility towards the New Deal, see generally Rauh, supra note 16, at 949-50
(discussing the low probabilityof winning a case before the Supreme Court composed of
four staunch conservativesand twojustices opposed to the New Deal); Treanor, supra note
16, at 611-13 ("the composition of the Supreme Court made invalidation [of some New
Deal legislation] inevitable").
85. Another example is the "hot oil" case discussed supra note 75. For Interior
Secretary Harold Ickes: "It makes me sick when I think of the way [the Justice
Department] handled our oil cases before the Supreme Court." Irons, supra note 16, at 72
(quoting Harold Ickes).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42.
87. See Irons, supra note 16, at 97 (describing how a National Recovery
Administration attorney who shared oral argument responsibilities with the Solicitor
General was forced to "contradict[] his fellow advocate");see also Cushman, supra note
16, at 132. For a discussion of lawyer attitudes (both corporate and governmental) to
NIRA, see Ronen Shamir, Managing Legal Uncertainty 15-35 (1995).
88. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 238-49 (discussing Department's failure to
advance a strong test case); MichaelJ. Klarman,ConstitutionalFact/Constitutional Fiction:
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Four Horsemen, for example, cast several votes in favor of New Deal initiatives.89 Likewise, Hughes and Roberts, the SwingJustices, "had hardly
been consistent foes of activistgovernment prior to the plan's announcement."90 While the New Deal Court certainly transformed, rather than
built upon Old Court doctrine,9' the fate of the New Deal hinged not just
on who sat on the Court but also on the lawyeringand lawmakingbefore
the Court.92 At the least, improvements in Second New Deal lawyering
provided cover to Justices who were prepared to uphold social reform
programs without directly contradicting prior decisionmaking. Owen
Roberts's "switch"is a classic example of this phenomenon, for Roberts
claimed that he never switched, but, instead, that poor lawyering prevented him from upholding minimum wage laws in an earlier case.93
Fourth, beyond the possible failings of lawyersand law writers, the
1936 election may have convinced the Court (or at leastJustices Roberts
and Hughes, its two swing voters) of persistent widespread public support
for the New Deal.94 Indeed, Hughes had written in 1936 that when the
A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 759,
774-75 n.98 (1992); Moglen, supra note 10, at 269.
89. The old age provisions of the Social Security Act, the Wagner Act, and the
Tennessee ValleyAuthorityare among these initiatives. For an inventory of cases in which
some or all of the Four Horsemen signed onto New Deal initiatives, see Cushman, supra
note 10, at 246-48 n.255.
90. Klarman, supra note 88, at 774-75 n.98; see supra note 75 for a discussion of
Justice Roberts;supra note 83 for a discussion ofJustice Hughes; see also Cushman, supra
note 10, at 243 (discussingJustice Roberts), 249 (discussingJustice Hughes).
91. On this point, EdwardPurcell-responding to BarryCushman's claim that post1937 decisionmaking is an outgrowthof existing doctrine-made the common sense point
that "[t]o show that a doctrinal passagewayexisted is important, but it is not to show why
the individual Justices-particularly Justice Roberts in a five-to-four decision-chose to
walk through it." Purcell, supra note 10, at 280.
92. Peter Irons suggests that good lawyeringexplains the Court's upholding of the
National Labor RelationsAct in 1937. See Irons, supra note 16, at 288-89. For arguments
that Irons is wrong, see Rauh, supra note 16, at 952-55; Treanor, supra note 16, at 612.
93. Specifically, Roberts claimed that the Court was not asked to overturn its 1923
disapproval of minimum wage restrictions until 1937, when Roberts's supposed "switch"
took place. See Memorandum from Owen Roberts to Felix Frankfurter(Nov. 9, 1945), in
Felix Frankfurter,Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311, 314-15 (1955). For an
assessment of both Roberts'sclaim and the authenticityof the Frankfurtermemo, compare
Michael Ariens, A Thrice-ToldTale, or Felix the Cat, 107 Harv.L. Rev. 620, 645-51 (1994)
(arguing that memo was non-existent, or at best, inaccurate) with Richard D. Friedman, A
Reaffirmation: The Authenticity of the Roberts Memorandum, or Felix the Non-Forger,
142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1985, 1985-95 (1994) [hereinafter Friedman, A Reaffirmation]
(defending the memo's accuracy) and Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other
Thought Experiments: The Hughes Court and ConstitutionalTransformation, 142 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1891, 1949-53 (1994) (supporting Roberts's claim).
94. The mid-term 1934 election was far less significant both because of its proximity
in time to the 1932 election and because Roosevelt, the embodiment of the New Deal, was
not up for reelection. The 1936 election, moreover, took on added significance because of
Roosevelt's lopsided electoral margin of 370 to 6. For this reason, I find unpersuasive the
claims of Barry Cushman and Mike Klarman that, since the 1934 election did not slow
down the Court's repudiation of several New Deal measures, there is no reason to think
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Court departed from "itsfortress in public opinion,"95it suffered severely
from self-inflicted wounds.96 For his part, Roberts, after retiring, explained the force of public opinion that beat against the Court: "Looking
back, it is difficult to see how the Court could have resisted the popular
urge for uniform standards throughout the country-for what in effect
was a unified economy."97 Along these lines, Roberts's shift in the minimum wage case occurred after the 1936 election but before Roosevelt
introduced his Courtpackingplan.98 Whether Roberts was simply following the election returns is uncertain; what is clear is that Roberts was not
bowing solely to the Courtpacking proposal.99
In light of the foregoing, Roosevelt and his advisors-particularly
Homer Cummings, the Courtpacking plan's chief architect (pp.
82-131)-can and should be faulted. By treating their defeats before the
Court as purely political, the Roosevelt Administration refused to consider the role that legal writing and lawyering may have played in
Supreme Court decisionmaking. By failing to look at its own blemishes
(pp. 78-81), the Administration could not see what the lawyers of the
Second New Deal did see: namely, an opportunity to fit New Deal programs into the fabric of prior Court doctrine.100 Furthermore,by viewing
the Supreme Court as unalterably opposed to New Deal reforms,101
Roosevelt did not take into account how his 1936 electoral landslide affected Supreme Court attitudes.
that the election of 1936 did influence the Court. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 228-38;
Klarman,supra note 88, at 774-75 n.98.
95. Charles E. Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 24 (1936).
96. See id. at 51-53.
97. OwenJ. Roberts, The Court and the Constitution 61 (1951). For this reason, it is
possible that Roberts did switch, but did not cave to the pressures of Courtpacking. See
generally Ariens, supra note 93, at 635-40 (providingFrankfurter'saccount of the reasons
for Roberts's switch).
98. See supra text accompanying note 93. Moreover, according to Felix Frankfurter,
Roberts voted to grant certiorari in this case prior to the 1936 election. See Frankfurter,
supra note 93, at 315. Frankfurter'sreporting, however, is suspect; it may well have been
motivated by a desire to shield the Court from charges that its decisionmaking is inherently
political. See Ariens, supra note 93, at 640-52. For a powerful critique of Ariens, see
Friedman, A Reaffirmation,supra note 93, at 1985-95.
99. At the same time, the Courtpacking plan may have figured into Roberts's
calculation, for Roberts later spoke of being "fully conscious" of the Court plan and
thought it placed a "tremendousstrain"on the Court. See Composition andJurisdiction
of the Supreme Court: Hearings on SJ. Res. 44 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2nd. Sess. 9 (1954)
(statement of OwenJ. Roberts);see also WalterF. Murphy,Congress and the Court 59-60
(1962) (suggesting that Roberts anticipated the Courtpacking plan before its formal
announcement). It is also likely that Roberts recognized that continuing judicial
invalidation of the New Deal imposed unacceptable costs on both the Court and the
nation. On this point, cf. Lessig, supra note 26, at 414 (stating that wherejudge's rhetoric
conflicts with "uncontested discourse,"judges face "infinite cost" of certain "rhetorical
moves" and risk engaging in "rhetoricalself immolation").
100. See Nelson, supra note 13, at 289; supra notes 76-78.
101. See supra notes 90-93; infra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
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Roosevelt also underestimated the burgeoning public distrust of a
too-powerful executive branch. Fears of totalitarian rule and the concomitant belief that the Supreme Court, while far from perfect, checked
elected government excesses, help explain why "FDR's[Court] message
generated an intensity of response unmatched by any legislative controversy of this century" (p. 134). For FDR opponents, the Courtpacking
plan proved to be a political bonanza, galvanizing opposition to the New
Deal and prompting "remonstrances comparing Roosevelt to Stuart tyrants and European dictators"(p. 137). The SenateJudiciary Committee
echoed these concerns, proclaiming "that we would rather have an independent Court, . . . a Court that will dare to announce its honest opinions ... [rather] than a Court that, out of fear or sense of obligation to
the appointing power"validates governmental action.102 This claim, that
"[w]e are not the judges of the judges. We are not above the Constituenabled Courtpackingplan opponents to cast Roosevelt as being
tion,"'103
more interested in executive-dominated centralized authority than in the
rule of law.
This is not to say that Roosevelt did not have good reason to act.
When his Courtpacking plan was announced, none of the Four Horsemen appeared ready to retire, and actuarial tables suggested that even
the oldest justice would live another five years.104With reason to think
that the Old Court would continue to invalidate governmental reform
efforts, Roosevelt appropriatelyfeared for the future of his New Deal.105
Furthermore, the possibility that the Second New Deal would have fared
better than early New Deal legislation does not mean that the Court was
poised to launch its doctrinal transformation. Instead, as Leuchtenburg
contends (pp. 231-32), the 1936 election and other external pressures
were almost certainly necessary to prompt the 1937 Constitutional
Revolution.
Whether the Courtpacking plan was a necessary ingredient to this
mix, however, is quite another matter. The combination of better legal
writing and Roosevelt's 1936 landslide victory were probably enough to
secure the critical swing votes of Justices Roberts and Hughes. Through
the appointment of pro-New DealJustices, moreover, the sweeping reversals of Old Court decisionmaking was secured. In other words, the
Courtpacking plan may well have undermined subsequent New Deal reform efforts without any offsetting benefits.
102. S. Rep. No. 711, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1937).
103. Id.
104. SeeJackson, supra note 11, at 185; Nelson, supra note 13, at 289.
105. The possibility that the Court would follow the 1936 election returns was not
seriously considered by Roosevelt. See Aslop, supra note 9, at 24. Justice Department
attorneys, however, did notice "a less hostile attitude in arguments" after Roosevelt's
landslide victory. Jackson, supra note 11, at 197; see also Nelson, supra note 13, at 291
(noting that Four Horsemen "treated [Government lawyers] with respect rather than
contempt" after election).
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TheSupremeCourtRebornnever seriously considers this possibility, arguing instead that the 1937 Revolution was simply too drastic a change to
have as its primary source better lawyering and the political impact of the

1936 elections (pp. 231-33). For Leuchtenburg, First New Deal lawyering was anything but "inept" (p. 232) and, consequently, "one cannot
seriously believe that more expert draftsmanship"of Second New Deal
legislation explains the Court's shift (p. 231). Although he recognizes
that Roberts's "White Monday"switch occurred after the 1936 election,
but before the introduction of the Court plan, Leuchtenburg claims that
"in the long history of the Supreme Court, no event has had more momentous consequences than Franklin Roosevelt's [Courtpacking]
message" (p. 162). As a result, Leuchtenburg commits the same error
that Roosevelt did, accepting the premise that the 1937 Revolution could
only have been accomplished through a direct assault on the Court.
III.

GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE NEW DEAL

The true nature of the Courtpacking fight becomes clear in a related
battle, the effort to reorganize the Justice Department, which combines
the themes of bad lawyering and Roosevelt's desire to increase the power
of the presidency. In 1933, FDR reorganized the Justice Department to
give it exclusive authority over much government litigation.'06 While this

change served centralized planning objectives, Roosevelt failed to recognize its effect on the quality of government lawyering. In this way,
Roosevelt's failure to appreciate the role of government litigators and
statute writersduring the Courtpackingepisode is part of a larger pattern
in which his pursuit of centralized planning blinded him to other ways of
solving the problem of the Old Court. Correspondingly, just as New Deal

opponents capitalized on voters' concerns of a too powerful President in
order to bring down the Court plan, Roosevelt's efforts to reform the
administrative state were also undermined by these fears, fears which first
took hold during the Courtpacking crisis. Ironically, Roosevelt pursued
both Courtpacking and the Justice Department reorganization as means
to the larger. end of strengthening the administrative presidency. As this
Part will show, the defeat of Roosevelt's administrative presidency campaign can be traced to these two initiatives.
A.

The DepartmentofJustice in the Age of Roosevelt

The New Deal was a "'lawyer's deal,'" a period where "lawyers and
legal means would stop the country's deterioration," where lawyers " 'enjoyed direct access to . . . [the] critical levers of power and monopolized
the instruments of governance,'" and where, for the editors of Ivy
League law reviews, "the lucre of New York did not match the excitement
106. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901
(1988).
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posed by the problems confronting Washington."'107 With the rise of the
administrative state, the lawyer's craft-the drafting of statutes and implementing regulations, as well as litigation defending their workproductdominated New Deal policymaking.108 As a result, the New Deal triggered not only an explosion in the ranks of government lawyers109 but
also numerous political battles over the proper conduct of federal legal
policymaking.
Roosevelt, although a lawyer himself, placed little faith in the power
of good lawyering to overcome Old Court opposition to New Deal reforms. His Courtpacking plan, by seeking to remake the Court through
political means, reflects this belief. This compartmentalized view that the
possible influence of legal arguments should give way to concerns of
power and politics also characterized Roosevelt's management of the federal legal apparatus. In 1933, Roosevelt strengthened the Department of
Justice's control of litigation so that he could better supervise the operations of government agencies.110 Consistent with his determination that
politics, not lawyering, mattered, Roosevelt did not consider the consequences of this reorganization on New Deal lawyering before the federal
courts. As a result, Roosevelt paid little, if any attention to disputes between the Department of Justice and New Deal agencies over the proper
handling of litigation. In retrospect, these disputes should have signalled
to the President the possibility that lawyering, after all, may matter.
Reorganization of the Justice Department was not a novel concept in
1933. Beginning with the establishment of aJustice Department in 1870,
Attorneys General have consistently sought to strengthen their control of
government litigation.111 Standing in the way, however, were powerful
department solicitors and their allies in Congress who limited Department of Justice authority through grants of independent litigation authority.112 In fact, on the eve of the New Deal, Attorney General John
Sargent reported to Congress that only 115 of 900 federally employed
attorneys were under his control, and at least nine separate government
107. Glennon, supra note 80, at 69 (quoting Irons, supra note 16, at x).
108. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 68-70.
109. It is interesting to note that the staff of theJustice Department grew from 250 in
1905 to 32,000 in 1968. See id. at 214 n.8.
110. See Exec. Order No. 6166 (1933), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901
(1988), discussed infra note 116.
111. See Cornell N. Clayton, The Politics of Justice: The Attorney General and the
Making of Legal Policy 73 (1992); SewallKey,The Legal Work of the Federal Government,
25 Va. L. Rev. 165, 181-201 (1938); Carl B. Swisher, Federal Organization of Legal
Functions, 33 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 973, 975-95 (1939).
112. Congress limited Roosevelt's control of the administrativestate by continuing to
grant litigation authority to select agencies throughout Roosevelt's presidency. See
Swisher,supra note 111, at 991-95. For treatments of the consequences of these grants of
litigation authority, see generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor
General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 255, 321-27 (1994);
Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal Litigating
Authority, 68Judicature 70, 73 (1984).
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agencies or departments had independent litigation authority.113
Through powers granted to the President under the 1932 Economy
Act,114however, Roosevelt, at the urging of Attorney General Homer
Cummings,115issued a June 1933 executive order that confined to "the
Department of Justice the responsibility of prosecuting and defending
Court actions to which the United States is a party."116
Centralizationof litigation authoritydid not sit well with the talented
New Deal lawyers who dominated the federal agencies and departments.117 Having come to Washington to work for newly created agencies, and determined to find creative solutions to the economic crisis that
ravaged the country, these lawyerswanted to change the world, not to
play second fiddle to the Department of Justice."8 Consequently, when
the Department of Justice sought to rein in highly talented agency lawyers and assert its dominance over federal legal policymaking, all hell
broke loose. Unwilling to cede voluntarily authority to the Department
of Justice, New Deal lawyerscomplained bitterly about the Department's
mishandling of its legal work.'19 For its part, the Department sometimes
appeared at least as interested in building up its power as it did in winning lawsuits.'20
113. See Clayton, supra note 111, at 75.
114. Pub. L. No. 212, 47 Stat. 382, 413 (1932) as amended by Pub. L. No. 428, 47 Stat.
1489, 1517-18 (1933). Under the statute, Congress could disapprove of proposed
reorganizationsthrough a legislativeveto. For a discussion of the politics of this legislative
veto provision, see Fisher & Devins, supra note 64, at 121-42.
115. See Irons, supra note 16, at 146.
116. Exec. Order No. 6166, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. ? 901 (1988). Under
the executive order, the internal legal work of government agencies was to be handled by
the agency itself. For further discussion of this divorce of functions, see Donald L.
Horowitz, The Jurocracy 12-24 (1977); Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular:
Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in Government Lawyers143 (Cornell
W. Clayton ed., 1995); Swisher, supra note 111, at 999-1000.
117. The Agricultural Agency Administration's Office of General Counsel, for
example, was headed by former Yale law professor and future appeals court judge Jerome
Frank and was staffed by future Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, future democratic
presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, futureYale law dean WesleySturges,future appeals
courtjudge Thurman Arnold, future Nuremberg war-crimesprosecutor and Columbia law
professor Telford Taylor, and Holmes law clerk and future subject of anti-communist
investigationsAlger Hiss. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 70-72.
118. Making matters worse, these lawyers doubted the abilities of Department of
Justice lawyers,most of whom had come to the Department at a time when institutional
and other limitations impeded its efforts to hire quality lawyers. Specifically, the
Department was limited both by numerous statutoryexceptions to its presumptivecontrol
of government litigation and by the fact that government jobs were not considered as
attractiveas jobs with New York law firms. See id. at 68-70 (discussing the dominance of
New Yorklaw firms prior to the creation of New Deal agencies); Swisher,supra note 111, at
999-1000 (discussing how Roosevelt's reorganizationaffected the Department of Justice's
legal policymaking authority).
119. See Glennon, supra note 80, at 83-84; see also Irons, supra note 16, at 220-25.
120. See, e.g., Irons, supra note 16, at 220-25 (discussing "the emerging political duel
between the two agencies"-the National Labor Relations Board and the Justice
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The resulting conflicts, needless to say, did not help New Deal reform efforts. Turf wars between the Justice Department and New Deal
agencies over the conduct and control of litigation proved time-consuming and emotionally draining.'21 More significantly, after wrestling control of litigation from a resisting agency, the Department sometimes
proved ill-equipped to advance vigorously agency interests.'22 Finally, at
times, efforts at coordination between Department and agency attorneys
backfired.'23 As a result, while an internal Department memorandum
emphasized that "care must be taken to avoid the impression that we are
seeking to curb or limit the authority of a particular agency,"'124the Department concluded that the best way to avoid "mishaps" was to be unrelenting in its quest to establish itself as chief litigator for the United
Department-and that duel's negative impact on creating an effective litigation strategy);
see also supra note 82.
121. Peter Irons describes three competing litigation strategies in his study on New
Deal lawyering: the use of political pressure to settle disagreements (legal politics), the use
of negotiation instead of litigation (legal reform), and the use of litigation to gain formal
court approval of agency action (legal crafting). Not surprisingly,as Irons recounts in
detail, the choice of one or another of these competing models prompted different types
of conflicts between New Deal agencies and the Department ofJustice. All of these battles,
however, were time consuming and emotional. See Irons, supra note 16, at 3-14; see also
Glennon, supra note 80, at 83-84 (describing conflict between Justice Department and
Agricultural Adjustment Administration). My research assistant, Roderick Ingram,
reached a similar conclusion after reviewingAttorney General Cummings's papers at the
Universityof Virginia. Cummings and his staff, for example, fought bitter fights with the
General Accounting Office, the Department of Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority,
and the National RecoveryAdministration. See The Papers of Homer Stille Cummings
(Special Collection of Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Accession # 9973)
[hereinafter Cummings Papers].
122. See supra notes 80-87, and infra note 123 and accompanying text; see also
Glennon, supra note 80, at 84 (describing how AgriculturalAdjustment Administration
litigation was turned over to "neophyte Justice Department] attorneys" who were no
match against industry's "skilled trial lawyers");see Irons, supra note 16, at 86-94
(describing Department ofJustice's mishandling of National RecoveryAct litigation); id. at
155 (noting that AAA lawyers"blame[d] their defeats . on the inexperience of Justice
Department lawyers).
123. At oral arguments in the National Recovery Act litigation, attorneys for the
National RecoveryAdministrationand Department ofJustice "openlydisagreed before the
Court on the meaning of the statute and its implications for the determinative delegation
issue." Rauh, supra note 16, at 950; see also Irons, supra note 16, at 95-100 (describing
oral arguments for Schechtercase). Another example of failed cooperation involved
Attorney General Cummings's authorization of the Petroleum Board to litigate a case on
its own behalf. This decision prompted several government agencies to complain to
Cummings about both the litigation strategyand the legal position advanced by the Board.
This episode is recounted in Letter from Homer S. Cummings, Attorney General, to
Charles E. Clark,Dean, Yale Law School (May 12, 1934), in Cummings Papers, supra note
121, Box 177, Folder 1934 March: Department of Justice Case File, 114-57-1-3.
124. Memorandum from Ugo Carusi,Executive Assistantto the Attorney General, to
Angus D. MacLean,AssistantAttorney General (Oct. 4, 1934), in Cummings Papers, supra
note 121, Box 173, Folder 1934 October to 1938 August.
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States.'25 During this period of transition,126 New Deal programmatic
objectives sometimes gave way to New Deal efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency through the centralization of litigation authority.
The Roosevelt White House did not intervene in these intra-executive disputes.127 Believing that judicial appointments, not legal arguments, were the key to transforming the Court, Roosevelt apparently concluded these turf wars were inconsequential. Yet, even if the White
House thought that legal advocacy mattered, FDR's interest in strengthening the administrative presidency may well have justified the shift in
litigation authority. In particular, by centralizing legal policymaking in
the Justice Department, the government can speak with a single voice in
court. Equally significant, the President or his cabinet level surrogate,
the Attorney General, is in charge of that voice. Under a decentralized
to competing exterscheme, in contrast, government agencies-subject
nal pressures from oversight committees and constituency interests-will
sometimes square off with each other in court.128 Decentralization,
moreover, encourages agencies to advance conflicting approaches to jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, and other issues that cut across all government litigation. To prevent New Deal agencies from discounting the
consequences of their legal arguments for other parts of the government,
it makes sense that Roosevelt would have wanted the Department of Justice to coordinate government litigation. 129
125. See Memorandum of unidentified author, Cummings Papers, supra note 121.
Box 177, Folder 1933July to 1935: Department ofJustice Case File, 114-0, Sec. 1-8. This
memorandum also notes that the granting of litigation authority to the Petroleum Board
was "an unwise expedient because they did not have the sense of responsibility to the
Department ofJustice. We had to terminate that arrangement in order to be sure that we
could control properly the work for which were responsible." Id.; see also Power of the
Attorney General in Matters of Compromise, 38 Op. Att'y Gen. 124 (1934) (Executive
Order No. 6166 "vestsin the Attorney General exclusive control of any case after reference
thereof to the Department of Justice.").
126. Today, of course, there are far fewer battles between the Department and its
agency clients. See Horowitz, supra note 116, at 133. Moreover, by having established its
control over nearly all governmental litigation, the Department is able to recruit the best
students from the most selective law schools. See id. at 132; U.S. Dep't of Justice, United
States Department of Justice Legal Activities 1995-96, at 8 (1995) (discussing how its
recruitment program is "highlycompetitive,"accepting only "outstanding"third year law
students).
127. Research undertaken by myself and my research assistants at the FDR
Presidential Libraryand the Homer Stille Cummings papers did not uncover direct White
House participation in intraexecutive litigation disputes. By failing to intercede when the
Justice Department upset agency desired, however, the White House tacitlysupported the
Department's position.
128. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (whose performance as
enforcer of environmental laws is at least sometimes measured by its aggressiveness) and
the Department of Energy (as potential violator of environmental laws) are likely to
advance different arguments in court.
129. The Roosevelt Department of Justice adopted this view-proclaiming, for
example, that one of the Solicitor General's principal functions is "to protect against
different agencies' taking inconsistent positions or positions which injure each other."
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This approach towards centralized, coordinated legal policymaking
matched Roosevelt's views on reorganization. According to Richard
Polenberg, Roosevelt felt that the primary purpose of reorganization was
not to reduce expenditures, but to strengthen the administrative presidency through "improved management, which would make administration more responsive to the national interest and better able to serve that
interest."'130 Along these lines, Roosevelt's Justice Department officials
spoke of "[c]onsistency . . . in the field of litigation" being "absolutely
necessary to the maintenance of efficiency and good administration," so
that when the United States appears in court "it appears as a single entity."1131 This linkage between "efficiency" and the United States appearing in court "as a single entity" is critical. It underscores the Roosevelt
Administration's belief in the President's role as chief executive of the
administrative state. In contrast, were the United States a conglomeration of "autonomous units," Justice Department control of litigation
might well frustrate the "autonomous" nature of government departments and agencies.
B.

Courtpackingand the Failed Reorganization of Roosevelt'sGovernment

Roosevelt's efforts to strengthen the administrative presidency extended well beyond his 1933 reorganization of the Department ofJustice.
Through his Committee on Administrative Management, headed by
Louis Brownlow, Roosevelt sought to expand the power of the President
and of the federal government vis-a-vis the states.132 First, Roosevelt embraced national planning, proclaiming that " 'the problems of townships,
counties and States, should be coordinated through large geographical
regions.' "133 Furthermore, Roosevelt wanted a National Planning Board
housed in the White House to oversee this regional system of planning
Memorandum from Richard S. Salant to the Solicitor General July 1, 1943) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
130. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 7.
131. Key, supra note 111, at 198-99. Roosevelt, however, claimed that the
'justification for sending this Justice Department] Executive Order up [to Congress]. . . is
that it will effect a savingsof more than $25,000,000." FranklinD. Roosevelt, A Message to
Congress Transmitting Executive Order No. 6166, Consolidating and Abolishing Many
Governmental Agencies (June 10, 1933), in 2 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at 223. In
all likelihood, this cost-cutting argument was advanced to help Roosevelt sell this
reorganization to Congress. This conclusion is supported by the Justice Department's
emphasis on efficiency concerns in its active lobbying for this order as well as Roosevelt's
rejection of cost savingsjustifications for governmental reorganizations. See Irons, supra
note 16, at 146; Key, supra note 111, at 198-99; see also Polenberg, supra note 14, at 8
(noting that Roosevelt perceived " 'that it is awfullyerroneous to assume that it is in the
reorganization of Departments and Bureaus that you save money' " (quoting Franklin D.
Roosevelt, Press Conference (May 31, 1933), in 1 Roosevelt Papers, supra note 11, at
333-34)).
132. See generally Peri E. Arnold, Making the ManagerialPresidency 81-117 (1986)
(examining Roosevelt's contribution to nearly a century of administrativereorganization).
133. Karl, supra note 57, at 186.
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boards.'34 Second, Roosevelt sought to strike back at Congressional efforts to limit presidential control of independent regulatory agencies.'35
Indeed, consistent with Roosevelt's view that " 'the independent commissions [should be] brought under the general supervision of Cabinet officers,' "136 the Brownlow Committee deemed independent agencies to
be Public Enemy Number One. In the Committee's view, independent
agencies undermined the President's power to direct governmental operations by removing those subordinates who were unable to advance his
agenda in a satisfactory manner.137 Starting in January 1937, the Administration tried to consolidate presidential authority through a massive reorganization of the burgeoning administrative state, including the establishment of a National Resources Planning Board.'38 Yet just as the
Supreme Court thwarted its efforts to gain control of these commissions
in Humphrey'sExecutor,'39the 1938 Congress rejected these administrative
reforms.140
Congress had good reason to oppose the Roosevelt reorganization,
especially its national planning component. As Barry Karl observed,
"[p] lanning requires administration. Administration requires bureaucracy. Bureaucracy threatens legislative control."''4' In fact, to combat
executive branch dominion of government, Congress purposefully limited presidential control of the bureaucracy by creating independent regulatory commissions.142 Consequently, had it approved Roosevelt's proposed reorganization, Congress would have severely limited its own
institutional authority.'43 Congress, however, did approve FDR's 1933 re134. See id. at 188 (discussing Roosevelt's attempts at managing the New Deal
through reorganization and the BrownlowCommittee).
135. See infra note 142; cf. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 444 (The "legacyof Progressive
faith in technocracy . . . [which] translated into a large degree of autonomy for agency
officials"had as much to do with these Congressionalrestrictionson presidential authority
as did congressional distrust of a very powerful president.).
136. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 25.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 41-46; see also Arnold, supra note 132, at
105-06 (noting that the Brownlow Report recommended transferring the policyadministrative operations of independent agencies to executive departments and
agencies).
138. See Karl, supra note 57, at 182-87.
139. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
140. For a comprehensive examination of these failed reorganization efforts, see
Polenberg, supra note 14, at 28-51.
141. Karl, supra note 57, at 192.
142. See id. at 192-93; see also Polenberg, supra note 14, at 44-45 (describing how
Congressional pressure prompted Roosevelt to back down from attempts to reorganize the
independent regulatory commissions). In addition, throughout Roosevelt's presidency,
Congress limited Department ofJustice control of independent agency litigation through
grants of independent litigation authority. See Swisher, supra note 111, at 991-95.
143. For an analogous argument, explaining why Congress conditions its grants of
legislativeauthoritythrough the legislativeveto and other checking mechanisms, see Louis
Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. 273
(Autumn 1993).
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organization of the Justice Department.144 Wfhat explains this difference
between the 1933 Congress and the 1938 Congress-which,
incidentally,
had an even more lopsided Democratic majority than the 1933 Congress?
Roosevelt's Courtpacking plan played a decisive role here.
"[R] eorganization was largely forgotten" during the Court controversy.145
Moreover, with "[t]he conservative opposition to Roosevelt crystallized
around the Court issue,"'46 Roosevelt's critics succeeded in depicting the
reorganization proposal as yet another attempt by Roosevelt to "establish
an executive dictatorship."'147 Specifically, just as the Courtpacking plan
exposed Roosevelt to charges that he placed his political agenda ahead of
the rule of law, the reorganization plan likewise was resisted because of
"fears and anxieties produced by European dictatorship."'148 Roosevelt
could not overcome this specter of a centralized totalitarian regime undermining democratic rule, for Courtpacking plan opponents had succeeded in casting him as a man of power rather than a man of law.'49
Consequently, unlike the One Hundred Days War, when Roosevelt was
able to push through his reorganization of theJustice Department,150 the
Courtpacking plan backlash made impossible any further expansions of
the administrative presidency.
Roosevelt was crushed by this defeat, having made attaining the aims
of the Brownlow Committee the centerpiece of his 1936-1940 term.15'
What is truly amazing and ironic about this turn of events is the pivotal
role played by Courtpacking in the undoing of this "Third New Deal."'152
First, the 1933 Congress that overwhelmingly approved Roosevelt's Department of Justice reorganization may well have been willing to approve
his 1937 reorganization plan. Second, absent the Courtpacking debacle,
it seems likely that the 1938 Congress would have approved the Roosevelt
reorganization. Even with the baggage of Courtpacking and ever-increasing fears of Europe's totalitarian regimes, the 1937 reorganization nonetheless passed the Senate and nearly passed the House (where it was re144. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
145. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 28; see also Arnold, supra note 132, at 109 (noting
that Roosevelt "ask[ed] his son James to shepherd the reorganization program while he
gave primaryattention to the judiciary plan").
146. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 88.
147. Polenberg, supra note 14, at 194.
148. Id. at 149.
149. See id. at 148-52.
150. Roosevelt sent Executive Order No. 6166 to Congress on June 10, 1933, the last
scheduled day of the 100 Day session. While some members characterized Roosevelt's
action as a "contemptuousgesture toward the Members of Congress,"77 Cong. Rec. 5617
(1933) (statement of Sen. Reed), and complained that "[t]here is no way in which
Congress can pass upon this matter under these circumstances,"id. at 5600 (statement of
Sen. Borah), most members applauded the consolidation of government litigation in the
Justice Department, condemning the existing arrangement as "a maze of conflicting and
anomalous provisions." Id. at 5615 (statement of Sen. Robinson).
151. See Karl, supra note 57, at 187-88.
152. See id. at 188.
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jected by a vote of 204 to 196, with 108 Democrats voting against the
bill).153 Needing only four additional votes to win approval, Roosevelt
might have had the political leverage to persevere in Congress without
the Courtpacking's galvanizing effect on the opposition. Third, had FDR
not pursued Courtpacking, not only would Congress have approved his
reorganization but, as Part II suggests, the Supreme Court may well have
upheld this Third New Deal. For example, nothing in Humphrey'sExecutor
or any other Supreme Court separation of powers decision limits Congress from making independent agencies more like executive departments and agencies.'54 In other words, by leaving the Court issue alone,
than suffer the Courtpacking's devastating boomeRoosevelt-rather
have garnered congressional and judicial approval of his
rang-could
Third New Deal. Fourth (and relatedly), by pursuing Courtpacking,
Roosevelt undermined the very objectives he was trying to pursue,
namely, to strengthen centralized governmental controls and to place the
President in charge of the administrative state.'55
The Courtpacking plan and the Justice Department reorganization
both show a similar failure to value properly the ability of lawyers to make
a difference. As a result, the Department of Justice reorganization may
have started a chain of events leading through the Courtpacking episode
and onto the failure of subsequent broader reforms. Had the Administration perceived the nexus between good lawyering and success in court,
it might have delayed its Courtpacking plan and paid more attention to
the consequences of its Justice Department reorganization. In particular,
as Part II suggests, there was reason for the Roosevelt Administration to
be cautiously optimistic about the Court's 1936-37 term. The Courtpacking plan, however, presupposed that the Old Court would not deem consequential either the 1936 election or differences between First and Second New Deal legislation and lawyering. Furthermore, as this Part
reveals, there was also reason for the Roosevelt Administration to recognize that the Justice Department reorganization affected government
lawyering before the Supreme Court. In advancing its Courtpacking
plan, however, the administration never considered the possible consequences of its reorganization effort. In other words, although strength153. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 7, at 279.
Executorthrough political
154. Roosevelt therefore could have overcome Humphrey's
Executorwas a unanimous decision, Roosevelt-even with several
means. Since Humphrey's
Supreme Court appointments-could not realisticallyexpect the Court to overturn it.
155. For similar reasons, Roosevelt was also outraged by the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the National IndustrialRecoveryAct in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). By holding that Congress had gone too far in delegating
stood in the way of FDR's efforts to centralize
lawmakingpower to the president, Schechter
authority through broadlyworded Congressional delegations. See Karl,supra note 57, at
197 ("Schechterwas a criticism ... [of] a far-reachingdesign for governmental reform.").
See generally, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the
United States 273-74 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the "Roosevelt Revolution" and the
changing functions of government).
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ening the Justice Department furthered Roosevelt's vision of the administrative presidency, Roosevelt erred by failing to link this reform effort to
Supreme Court decisionmaking. This is not to say that the Justice Department reorganization is to blame for the Supreme Court's rejection of
much of Roosevelt's First New Deal.'56 Yet, by assuming that litigation
skills have no bearing on outcomes, Roosevelt's simultaneous pursuit of
Supreme Court and Justice Department reorganization cost him dearly.
Future social reform and reorganization efforts were casualties to a
Courtpacking plan that marked "the beginning of the end of the New
Deal."'57
CONCLUSION

The Courtpacking episode, despite the passage of sixty years and
countless hours of academic attention, remains a subject of debate. Over
the past two years, for example, important questions have been raised
about both Justice Roberts's claim that the Courtpacking plan did not
affect his "switch"'58 and the generally accepted view that the Constitutional Revolution of 1937 transformed, rather than built upon, existing
Court doctrine.'59 Courtpacking's continuing relevancy is not limited to
academic writings. In Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,'60 the Supreme Court's
surprising 1992 reaffirmation of abortion rights, the plurality and dissenting opinions advanced strikingly different visions of Courtpacking's role
in the 1937 Revolution. For the plurality, who sought to distinguish the
1937 "switch" from efforts to have the Court overrule Roe v. Wade under
"political fire," there is no reference to the Courtpacking conflagration.
Instead, the switch is described as a response to the Old Court's "fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."'6' For the dissent, the plurality committed error by failing to consider "Franklin
Roosevelt's proposal to 'reorganize' this Court," for it "is difficult to imagine a situation in which the Court would face more intense [pressure]
than it did at that time."'62
William Leuchtenburg's The Supreme Court Reborn, while it will not
end the debate over the Courtpacking plan, is an enormously valuable
contribution to an overcrowded field. By telling the story of the politics
156. Cf. Rauh, supra note 16, at 948-50 (stating that poor litigation was unrelated to
the Supreme Court's rejection of the New Deal); Treanor, supra note 16, at 612 (stating
that composition of Supreme Court was behind the failure of the New Deal).
157. Kennedy, supra note 9, at 88.
158. See AMiens,supra note 93, at 623.
159. See Cushman, supra note 10, at 203.
160. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
161. Id. at 2812.
162. Id. at 2863 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The 1995 Lopezdecision also hints at
the Courtpacking's continuing relevance, with Justice Souter noting in dissent that the
ConstitutionalRevolution of 1937 occurred "onlyafter one of this Court's most chastening
experiences." United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1652 (1995) (SouterJ., dissenting).

266

COLUMBIALAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:237

behind the Courtpacking plan, The SupremeCourtRebornmakes clear that
neither Roosevelt nor his staff, including Attorney General Homer Cummings, thought that the Old Court could be moved by better legal advocacy, statutory drafting, or Roosevelt's 1936 electoral landslide. Moreover, through his review of the Humphrey's Executor litigation,
Leuchtenburg also reveals that the Courtpacking plan was as much about
Roosevelt's interest in strengthening the administrative presidency as it
was about New Deal social reform programs.
Leuchtenburg does not address the role that poor lawyering and statutory drafting may have played in the Court's repudiation of the National
Recovery Act, Agricultural Adjustment Act, and several other One Hundred Day reforms. While suggesting that better lawyering could not overcome Supreme Court resistance towards Roosevelt and his New Deal,
Leuchtenburg's failure to consider meaningfully this issue leaves his history subject to attack. For example, there is good reason to think that the
confluence of the 1936 election and improvements in the crafting of legislation to meet judicially imposed hurdles played a decisive role in the
"switch" that began the 1937 Revolution.
Leuchtenburg also does not consider the possible significance of
Roosevelt's 1933 Department of Justice reorganization to Courtpacking.
This reorganization is illuminating for two quite disparate reasons. First,
although this reorganization affected government litigation before the
Supreme Court, Roosevelt never took this reorganization into account
when formulating his Courtpacking proposal. Second, Congress's willingness to accede to this reorganization suggests that Roosevelt's pursuit
of Courtpacking undermined his administrative presidency agenda.
Leuchtenburg should not be faulted too much for failing to consider
these matters. He does not intend that his history speak to these issues.
More than anything, his is the story of why the Roosevelt Administration
pursued its Courtpacking plan, why the plan was defeated, and the consequences of its defeat. Consequently, just as the Roosevelt Administration
did not seriously contemplate the possibility that its Constitutional
Revolution could be launched without a "frontal attack" on the courts,
Leuchtenburg, too, pays little attention to this issue. Correlatively, it is
not surprising that Leuchtenburg does not address FDR's reorganization
of the Justice Department, for the Roosevelt Administration never seriously considered the possible impact of this reorganization on its litigation agenda.
The SupremeCourtReborn,then, is neither monumental nor definitive.
It is, however, essential reading on the Roosevelt Revolution. Literate
and well-crafted, Leuchtenburg's work is a compelling account of the
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1937 Constitutional Revolution through the eyes of the Roosevelt
Administration.163

163. With a two-volumehistory of the constitutional crisis of the 1930s in the works,
Leuchtenburg may yet speak the last word on those matters not considered in TheSupreme
Court Reborn (p. ix).

